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The second and third chapters in this section draw attention to circumstances in 
which concerns regarding the ability of the criminal justice process to achieve just 
outcomes intersect with concerns regarding the potential effects of that process 
on the psychological well-being of various participants. These chapters by Bruce 
Winick, Jodi Quas, and Bradley McAuliff can reasonably be understood as com-
plimentary in the following sense. Winick’s chapter endorses a substantive legal 
standard and a proposed procedure for applying that standard that raises a series 
of questions regarding the manner in which that procedure, and the participants 
in that procedure, will be able to fulfill its goals. The chapter by Quas and Mc Au-
liff emphasizes the extensive body of empirical research addressing the effects of 
the criminal justice process on participating children in an attempt to promote the 
development of processes that will protect the well-being of those children while 
promoting just outcomes. 
4.1 Serious Mental Illness and Capital Punishment 
In his chapter on determining when severe mental illness should disqualify a defen-
dant from capital punishment, Winick writes that those with severe mental illness 
(SMI) at the time of the offense should be afforded the same categorical preclusion 
from capital punishment as those with mental retardation (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) 
and as juveniles (Roper v. Simmons, 2005). Both those with mental retardation 
and juveniles were found to be categorically less culpable and therefore less appro-
priate for capital punishment. He endorses the approach favored by the American 
Bar Association (ABA), American Psychological Association (APA), American Psy-
chiatric Association (APA), and National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), that 
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there should be an exemption from capital punishment only for those with SMI 
who suffer significant impairment of their capacity to: (1) appreciate the nature, 
consequences, or wrongfulness of their conduct; (2) exercise rational judgment in 
relation to their conduct; or (3) conform their conduct to the requirements of law 
(Winick, 2009, this volume, p. 45) He outlines a number of procedural changes that 
could occur if such a categorical bar were in place, and he maintains that these pro-
cedural changes would positively impact not only the defendant, but also possibly 
the family of the victim and various other actors in the legal system. 
For the purposes of this discussion, assume that there is a subset of offend-
ers with SMI who do not qualify as not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), who 
manifest the above impairments, who are arguably less culpable than unimpaired 
offenders, and who probably should not face the death penalty. The question be-
comes how to determine who these people are, and what procedures should ap-
ply to them. Throughout the chapter, Winick relies heavily on laws and cases 
involving mental retardation, making the case that what applies to those with 
mental retardation applies to those with SMI who have the requisite “impaired 
capacities.” While many of those with mental retardation and SMI share some 
similarities, there are many important differences between these two diagnostic 
categories. Both mental retardation and SMI cause significant impairment in in-
dividuals’ functioning. The description of “impaired capacities” outlined above 
could certainly apply to those with mental retardation and some of those with 
SMI. However, there are crucial differences between these two categories of psy-
chological impairment that raise important questions regarding the reliability of 
retrospective assessment of SMI in a relatively limited pretrial hearing. 
First, mental retardation, at its various levels, is a specific diagnosis whereas 
SMI is not. Mental retardation has a specific description and agreed-upon crite-
ria within the lexicon of mental disorders (DSM-IV, 1994). Although the precise 
measure of mental retardation that would constitute a barrier to capital punish-
ment may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the category and its levels are 
well defined and well accepted within the mental health community. Under Win-
ick’s proposal, SMI would become a legal definition that would remain undefined 
clinically, and therefore would be left to courts or legislatures to determine. SMI 
could cover a multitude of diagnostic categories and would likely vary signifi-
cantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Probably the most common perception of 
SMI would include schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Those diagno-
ses would comport with the public’s perception of what mental illness is. How-
ever, those with cognitive impairments, such as dementia and delirium, could 
qualify as well as those with severe mood disorders. SMI could also be descrip-
tive of those with the serious dissociative disorders (such as dissociative identity 
disorder) and even in some with severe personality disorders (such as borderline 
personality disorder). Therefore, a good deal of the DSM-IV could be captured by 
potential legal descriptions of SMI. 
Another concern raised by the differences between mental retardation and men-
tal illness is that, by definition, mental retardation is a global impairment of cog-
nitive capacities. When an individual is diagnosed with mental retardation, while 
there may be some variation within their limitations, they have significant deficits 
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in all areas of cognitive functioning. If there is a deficit only in a specific area of cog-
nitive functioning, that would more likely be defined as a specific learning disabil-
ity. Therefore, a diagnosis of mental retardation would be an accurate and consis-
tent prediction of a person’s functional impairment in virtually all situations. 
On the other hand, individuals who carry diagnoses potentially covered by 
the descriptor SMI can be fairly functional in some, and perhaps many areas, 
and they can be significantly impaired in other areas. For example, an individ-
ual might experience paranoid delusions about aliens who are trying to poison 
him and make him ill, but he might remain competent and confident in handling 
his financial obligations. He then could be severely impaired in managing his diet 
(only green canned vegetables) and in dealing with medical professionals (the 
aliens in disguise who are trying to kill him). He would not necessarily be im-
paired in dealing with his banker and paying his bills. Should an individual be 
severely impaired in a manner that profoundly affects all aspects of his life, it is 
hard to understand why he should not be found to be NGRI. 
Not only is mental retardation a specific diagnostic category within the DSM-
IV, it also has well-established and standardized methods of assessment. Eval-
uating an individual for mental retardation is a relatively straightforward pro-
cedure. It requires the standardized administration of an individual intellectual 
test, an assessment of adaptive functioning, and a review of the individual’s de-
velopmental history. The intelligence test assesses the individual’s performance 
on a number of standardized tasks that have been normed on a standardized 
population. At the level of mental retardation that would be at issue for any le-
gal proceedings there are one or two commonly used standardized tests. Assess-
ment of adaptive functioning, by report of the individual and those who inter-
act with him or her, looks at practical functioning in a wide array of daily tasks. 
The history determines the etiology of the retardation, including early develop-
mental history and any events that may have affected the individual’s function-
ing and development. An assessment and diagnosis of mental retardation can be 
done without any knowledge of the individual’s criminal activity. It would only 
be at the upper levels of mental retardation (mild) that an individual would likely 
meet the requirements of criminal responsibility. Those at lower levels of func-
tioning would be likely to be found not guilty by reason of mental defect and also 
incompetent to stand trial. In a sense, measuring intellectual functioning is much 
more of an actuarial process, although it does involve some clinical judgment. 
While there are various assessment instruments which aid in the evaluation of 
those with mental illness, such assessments rely much more heavily on clinical 
judgment than do assessments of metal retardation. There is no single standard-
ized method of assessing SMI, since it is not a clinical diagnosis. There are no 
tests comparable to intelligence test in that they are conventionally accepted as 
determining an individual’s psychological condition as SMI. Therefore the deter-
mination of SMI is much more fluid and open to interpretation. This would be 
especially true at the level where the individual is not NGRI but would still be un-
der consideration for preclusion from capital punishment. Presumably, if some-
one is so severely impaired that it is clear to all, it is much more likely that he or 
she would be found NGRI. 
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Along with the fact that the symptoms of SMI vary significantly within 
individuals and between individuals in the same diagnostic categories, many 
symptoms of SMI can be ameliorated by medication. In the area of schizophrenic 
and psychotic disorders there is a vast array of antipsychotic medications which, 
for many individuals afflicted with psychoses, can reduce the more florid and 
disturbing symptoms. While it is difficult to completely eliminate delusional 
thinking, it can be reduced to a significantly more controllable level. Many an-
tipsychotic medications can also reduce or even eliminate hallucinatory experi-
ences. Therefore, understanding an individual’s functioning at any given time 
would have to take into account whether he or she were medicated and the im-
pact of medication at the time of the offense. That raises the concern that a person 
might qualify as SMI at one point in time, and, with proper medication control-
ling symptoms, not qualify as SMI at some other time, while carrying the same 
diagnosis. Thus, establishing that an offender manifests SMI at a particular time 
before or after an offense does not clearly establish that he or she suffered SMI at 
the time of the offense. In contrast, there are no medications that can directly im-
prove functioning in an individual with mental retardation. There may be some 
medications that can improve ancillary functioning, such as medications to re-
duce anxiety or improve focus, but there are none that can increase intellectual 
functioning overall. Thus, the severity of mental retardation remains consistent 
over time, rendering it less difficult to retrospectively establish the severity of im-
pairment at the time of the offense. 
Therefore, a psychological assessment of an individual that would be of assis-
tance to the court to determine whether or not he or she fits one of the diagnostic 
categories that would likely be included in the category of SMI would necessitate a 
thorough understanding of the legal standard in the particular jurisdiction and of 
the relationship between that standard and clinical diagnoses. For example, is any-
one who carries the diagnosis of schizophrenia considered SMI or just those with 
serious symptoms? Is the individual not SMI at some points, as when properly 
medicated with symptoms well controlled, but SMI at others, when off medication 
and experiencing more florid symptoms? Because the recommended rule empha-
sizes the individual’s behavior “at the time of the offense,” any assessment would 
have to take into account the individual’s psychological impairment at that time. 
This proposal further narrows the category to be precluded from capital pun-
ishment to those with SMI who have a significant impairment in their capacity to 
appreciate the nature and consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, to exer-
cise rational judgment in relation to their conduct, or to conform their conduct to 
the requirements of the law (Winick, 2009, this volume, p. 45). Therefore, any as-
sessment relevant to the legal questions would have to take into consideration the 
particular conduct and understanding of the law that the person had at the time 
of the crime. The assessment would involve a thorough understanding of the indi-
vidual’s psychological impairment at the time of the crime, the details of the crime 
itself, and the relationship between the two. That assessment would necessitate the 
defendant conceding the facts of the crime and a description of his/her thinking/ 
belief at the time. For example, if our paranoid individual in the above example 
stabbed and killed the nurse who was giving him his flu shot because he believed 
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she was an alien trying to kill him, he might fit the definition of SMI and “signifi-
cant impairment” for the purposes of preclusion from capital punishment. How-
ever, if that same schizophrenic individual, properly medicated, stabbed the nurse 
because she made him wait too long in line and he was angry, he might not be 
sufficiently impaired to qualify as SMI for the purposes of preclusion from capital 
punishment. Nor would he be if he shot a teller while attempting to rob the drive 
up window at his bank because he wanted more money. Knowledge of the crime 
and the thinking/ belief at the time would not be necessary for the assessment of 
mental retardation, which can be done absent any knowledge of the crime itself. 
For that reason, a pretrial hearing, although focusing on the defendant’s mental 
illness, would be much more involved than one making a determination of men-
tal retardation. It would still necessitate a thorough airing of the “gruesome facts 
of the crime” in order to determine the relationship between the defendant’s im-
paired processes and the criminal conduct. The psychologist would have to know 
exactly what happened and what the defendant was thinking at the time to evalu-
ate the relationship between any diagnostic category and the crime. Since the de-
termination of both SMI and “impaired processes” are legal decisions the judge 
would also have to know the details of the crime to make that judgment. That 
raises the question of what sources for the facts of the crime would be allowed. 
For example, would the psychologist or judge rely only on the information pro-
vided by the defendant or would he/she get the crime scene photos? None of this 
is necessary in a case involving mental retardation in which the judge only needs 
to decide which psychological evaluation to accept. 
Given the complexity of determining that an exemption from capital pun-
ishment is warranted for some individuals with SMI, Winick’s proposal that 
such hearings be done by judges rather than juries makes sense. The judge 
would have to first determine whether the individual was SMI at the time of 
the crime and the effect of that SMI on the criminal behavior. Given the poten-
tial for fluctuation in functioning within individuals with a history of SMI, it 
would be quite possible that a person who appears relatively intact at the time 
of the hearing was quite impaired at the time of the crime. Furthermore, de-
termination of whether the requisite “significant impairments” occurred at the 
time of the crime requires a nuanced analysis of what qualifies as “significant 
impairments,” how those impairments impacted the individual’s behavior, and 
whether they rose to the level that would preclude capital punishment. Judges 
have a greater understanding of the law and are “probably more due process 
oriented than capital juries” (Winick, 2009, this volume, p.). Judges would likely 
have more exposure to cases in which SMI plays a part, either for NGRI or in 
other exemption hearings. They would therefore have a wider experiential base 
with which to compare the extant case to others, as well as more experience 
with evaluating expert testimony. This recommendation is consistent with Da-
vid Baldus’ research into judicial versus jury sentencing in capital cases (Baldus, 
Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2002). He found support for greater consistency 
in judicial sentencing compared to jury sentencing (Baldus et. al., 2002, p.669). 
Preclusion of an individual with SMI and the requisite impairments would be 
potentially more complex than capital sentencing and require more legal un-
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derstanding and more sophistication with regard to mental health issues than 
would be found in most juries. 
Winick also raises considerations with respect to Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
the intentional and unintentional psychological impact of the law on the well-be-
ing of the people involved (Wexler & Schopp, 1992). His contention is that having 
the issue of preclusion from capital punishment decided pretrial would signifi-
cantly reduce the stress on those involved in the process. It seems reasonable that 
if the defendant were found not eligible for capital punishment in a pretrial hear-
ing, there would be significantly less stress for those involved in the guilt and 
penalty phases of the actual trial. They would not face the possibility that the de-
fendant might eventually be put to death as a result of their decisions. He noted 
that there would likely be less intense scrutiny on the judge in a non-capital trial 
as well as less potential distress for the jury. The same could hold true for the 
attorneys. There is a question regarding the feelings of the family of the victim. 
While some may feel relief at having the death penalty off the table and therefore 
the potential of more timely closure, others may feel cheated out of the retribu-
tion they feel is deserved. 
Although those involved in the pretrial hearing would be making decisions 
that could place the defendant in the position of being eligible for capital punish-
ment, it is reasonable to expect that the stress would still be less than the stress 
of a capital sentencing hearing since they would be insulated from the final out-
come by the guilt and penalty phases of the actual trial. The judge (or jury) would 
know that even if the defendant was found eligible for capital punishment, sev-
eral more legal proceedings intervene prior to his or her facing death. While Win-
ick did not mention the psychologist, it would also seem reasonable to expect 
that participating in a pretrial determination of eligibility for capital punishment 
would be less stressful than relevant evaluations further along the process, such 
as an evaluation of competency to face execution. Presiding at a pretrial hearing 
might be quite stressful for the judge, however, in that he or she may face even 
more intense scrutiny as the sole decision-maker regarding whether the defen-
dant would ultimately face capital sentencing. 
Throughout the paper, Winick focuses on the blessings that would occur if 
an individual with SMI and the requisite impairments could be precluded from 
capital punishment in a pretrial judicial hearing. He does not discuss the impact 
of such a process when the defendant is found eligible for capital punishment. 
All of the Therapeutic Jurisprudence advantages would vanish. The stressors on 
the individuals involved in a capital trial would still be present, along with the 
added strain of the rather complex pretrial hearing itself, almost the trial before 
the trial. Winick was also concerned about the “lens” through which a capital-
qualified jury views the evidence in a capital trial. If the use of a pretrial hearing 
to determine eligibility for capital punishment were commonly understood, and 
the defendant were found to be eligible, jurors would potentially have another 
“lens” through which to view the defendant and the evidence. First, the defen-
dant would have conceded the details of the crime for the purposes of the pretrial 
hearing. Would this increase the likelihood of a guilty verdict at trial? Second, a 
judge has decided that the defendant was sane enough to face the possibility of 
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the death penalty. The jury might assume that the sanity issue has been settled 
and no longer needs to be considered. This might, for example, have a significant 
effect on a jury’s willingness to consider mental illness, or even SMI, as a mitiga-
tor during the penalty phase. 
Another question arises regarding how this pretrial process would work in 
conjunction with a potential plea of NGRI. Since the issue of NGRI is handled at 
trial, would the defendant have to pursue a pretrial hearing to determine if he/
she is eligible for capital punishment and then present the NGRI defense at trial, 
or would a pretrial determination of eligibility effectively preclude an NGRI de-
fense, although it technically should not? Insofar as the defendant must pursue 
each claim in separate phases, would the pretrial process regarding SMI contam-
inate the accurate evaluation of the NGRI defense during the trial? Alternately, 
would the desire to pursue a NGRI defense lead the defendant to make a strate-
gic decision to forgo the pretrial SMI hearing in circumstances in which it should 
be addressed? 
It seems likely that there is a subset of defendants who, while not NGRI, are 
sufficiently impaired because of SMI to be less culpable and not deserving of the 
death penalty. The question becomes how to accurately identify these people, and 
what procedures should be used to ensure fairness. The process endorsed by Win-
ick has the potential to be extremely complex and vary widely from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction. For some participants in these procedures, the pretrial determi-
nation might reduce the psychological stress without undermining other impor-
tant considerations, such as the accuracy of the determinations and comparative 
justice. The potential length and complexity of such hearings suggests, however, 
that they might inflict substantial stress on some participants under some circum-
stances. Alternatively, attempts to reduce the length or complexity of such hear-
ings might undermine attempts to attain comparative or non-comparative justice. 
Thus, an attempt to design and implement such hearings in a manner that amelio-
rates harm to the psychological well-being of the participants will require an ex-
tended inquiry regarding a complex set of empirical and justificatory questions. 
The third chapter in this section discusses a related set of empirical studies that 
are relevant to a different category of criminal proceedings. 
4.2 Protecting Child Victim Witnesses 
Quas and McAuliff present information on children’s involvement in the criminal 
justice system. They emphasize both the necessity of having children in court and 
also the potential impact of that participation on children’s well-being. They pres-
ent data on the kinds of stressors that can occur when children are involved in le-
gal procedures and the kinds of accommodations that might be made to mitigate 
those stressors. Some of those stressors include lack of legal knowledge, repeated 
interviews especially by different people whom the children do not know, testi-
fying, facing the perpetrator in court, case length, and case outcome. Relatively 
non-controversial interventions that have addressed some of these stressors in-
clude providing information about the legal process to child witnesses, coordi-
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nating investigations through the use of child advocacy centers (CACs), and pro-
viding support persons. Other, more controversial changes to procedures, have 
included the use of videotaped testimony and testimony outside the courtroom 
via closed circuit television. 
Quas and McAuliff refer in particular to data about child victims of sexual abuse 
who become witnesses since much of the research on children’s involvement as 
witnesses in both the criminal and juvenile systems has been done with this pop-
ulation. They note that there are many factors common to child sexual abuse cases 
that are also common in other kinds of criminal cases. These include case length, 
repeated interviews, testifying, and case outcomes. However, there are impor-
tant factors central to sexual abuse cases that may not be found in other situations 
where children might testify. Primary among them is that most children who tes-
tify in sexual abuse cases are the victims. Most often, they have a prior relation-
ship with the perpetrator who uses that relationship to involve the child in sex-
ual activity. Since children rarely disclose sexual abuse immediately (if ever) the 
abuse has often continued over a significant period of time (Lyon, 2007; Roesler & 
Wind, 1994). Because of these factors and the sexual nature of the crime, child vic-
tim/witnesses commonly experience lasting feelings of responsibility, shame, em-
barrassment, and guilt (Sgroi, 1982; Roesler & Wind, 1994). They often feel guilty 
for the abuse itself, for the disruption caused by the disclosure, and for the conse-
quences to the perpetrator whom the child may care about. Also, it is not uncom-
mon for them to risk relationships with other family members by virtue of the dis-
closure. Therefore, child sexual abuse cases, while likely being the most common 
situation in which children testify, and while providing most of the available data 
on the impact of legal proceedings on children, present additional stressors that 
may not be present in other types of cases where children might testify. 
Regarding the consequences of legal involvement on children, Quas and McAu-
liff enumerate a number of areas that may cause stress or trauma for children. The 
first area they discuss is legal understanding. They note that children are limited in 
both general legal knowledge and also about the specifics of their case. The ques-
tion becomes how this lack of knowledge impacts both children’s ability to par-
ticipate fully as witnesses and the level of distress that they feel. Children who 
are maltreated often feel partly responsible for the maltreatment and may assume 
that the legal involvement signifies that they are in trouble or that they are causing 
trouble for others. Children who are fearful that they are in trouble may disclose 
less information and experience more confusion and stress during the process. Be-
cause providing children with information regarding legal proceedings would not 
negatively impact those proceedings, it would appear to be a straightforward way 
to enhance children’s participation and potentially reduce stress. 
Children need information both about how the court system works in general 
and about the specifics of their case. This may reduce their level of anxiety and 
contribute to the perception that the process is fair (Melton et al., 1992). Research 
efforts might refine our understanding of the kinds of legal information that are 
important to children of particular age groups, the best method for delivery, and 
how to assess whether children truly understand the information they need. For 
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example, there has been significant research in the medical field on the utility of 
preparing children prior to medical procedures (Cardona, 1994). Some of those 
studies have looked at parents providing the information and the use of video-
tapes of children explaining the procedures to children, which the children have 
found helpful in reducing their anxiety and in helping them cope with the pro-
cedure itself (Pinto & Hollandsworth, 1989). As with adults, keeping children in-
formed regarding the specifics of their case and why things take as long as they 
do is important. Children’s perception of time is different from adults’ sense of 
how long things take. It is also harder for especially young children to keep track 
of the passage of events. Therefore, they need more support and ongoing infor-
mation to understand the status of their case. 
Another potential source of stress that Quas and McAuliff review is the im-
pact of repeated interviews on children. Certainly, at the investigative stage, 
there is significant concern regarding the impact of repeated interviews on chil-
dren (Poole & Lamb, 1998; Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Olafson, 2007). This concern 
stems from the need for accuracy and from sensitivity to the impact of the pro-
cess on children. The modifications in the investigative process that have been 
recommended, including minimizing unnecessary multiple interviews and the 
use of child advocacy centers, reflect the recognition that repeated questioning of 
children has the potential for affecting the quality of information as well as the 
child’s experience (Faller, 2007). Although children report that the experience of 
multiple interviews is negative (Tedesco & Schnell, 1987; Quas et al., 2005), re-
search efforts might focus on the impact of such interviews when they have been 
conducted in a child friendly, developmentally appropriate manner. It can be 
quite a relief for children to finally talk about ongoing abuse, a burden they of-
ten bear in secret. Also, children are fairly flexible when the reasons for adult ac-
tions are explained. Thus, if repeated interviews are necessary to gather or clar-
ify relevant information, or to prepare for court, children might be able to handle 
them fairly well if they are done appropriately, the reason is explained, and the 
children understand the process. 
Quas and McAuliff note that testifying appears to be the most stressful act of 
legal involvement for children. Testifying is difficult for both children and adults. 
A major source of stress for children in the courtroom is having to face the defen-
dant. Facing the perpetrator—in sexual abuse cases it is most likely someone with 
whom the child has had a trusted relationship—is what children say is the most 
stressful part of being in court (Goodman et al., 1992). When children don’t un-
derstand the protections that are in place, they may fear that the perpetrator may 
be able to approach them in the courtroom. Even when children recognize that 
they are physically safe in the courtroom, they worry about what the perpetrator 
may be able to do to them outside of court, which in some cases is not unrealistic. 
Since most of the child victim/witnesses who have been studied have been in ex-
tended abusive relationships with the perpetrator, they often continue to feel vul-
nerable and anxious even when their physical safety is assured. Aside from fear 
(realistic and unrealistic), child victim/witnesses often feel guilty about testifying 
against a parent, relative, or friend. Also, they are embarrassed about having to 
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talk about sexual matters in open court. Again, many of these factors are unique 
to the population most often studied. 
Children are anxious about facing the perpetrator, even in therapeutic settings. 
However, particularly in sexual abuse cases, facing the perpetrator and express-
ing their distress about what happened to them is an important part of the heal-
ing process for victims. This process acknowledges the reality of the abuse and 
who is responsible for it. It is especially important that the non-offending par-
ent, usually the mother, acknowledges the reality of the abuse, condemns it, and 
is supportive of the victim. When the perpetrator takes responsibility for his be-
havior and, hopefully, apologizes, it is even more therapeutic for the victim. That 
raises the question of whether or how testifying in court can attain some of these 
same therapeutic gains. It is possible that testifying in open court could be a way 
for the child to openly declare the reality of the experiences that they have had. 
It is also a way for adults to listen to and take seriously what the child has to say, 
with a very formalized procedure. Grown-ups are listening carefully to the child 
and asking questions to understand better. Even cross examination, which can be 
confusing for both adults and children, is an acknowledgment of what the child 
has said. If children can be taught how to manage difficult cross examination, that 
further validates what they have to say. Research that informs our ability to cre-
ate procedures that support the child’s ability to respond adaptively to cross ex-
amination would enhance the children’s well-being and their ability to contribute 
to an effective process of adjudication. 
A related issue that Quas and McAuliff note is the manner and question type 
used in cross examination. A major focus of training for those who investigate 
child abuse and child sexual abuse is how to talk to children in a developmen-
tally appropriate, non-leading manner (Poole & Lamb, 1998). Cross-examination, 
if anything, is often the opposite. Questions can be confusing and highly sug-
gestive. The language is often inappropriate for the child’s age and experience. 
As they point out, these kinds of questions are often difficult for adults and be-
yond the ability of children to comprehend. Accommodations are already made 
for individuals who are deaf and for those who do not speak English. It might be 
worth studying what kinds of courtroom linguistic accommodations would pro-
mote the ability of children to testify as accurately and completely as possible. 
Presumably, such accommodations would also reduce confusion and therefore 
distress for those children. Professionals who provide expert testimony often pur-
sue extensive training in preparing to testify effectively. Perhaps some analogous 
form of training would assist many children in increasing their level of accuracy 
and in reducing the amount of distress they experience. 
One of the factors that impacts how well children react to testifying appears to 
be maternal support. Children who do not receive maternal support during legal 
proceedings function significantly more poorly over time (Goodman et al., 1992). 
Similarly, children who receive maternal support are likely to disclose sexual abuse 
earlier and experience less distress (Elliott & Briere, 1994; London, Bruck, Ceci, & 
Shuman, 2005; Olafson & Lederman, 2006; Shaw, Lewis, Loeb, Rosado, & Rodri-
guez, 2001). Previous research has found that children’s perceptions of the legal 
process may very well be mediated by the perceptions of their caretakers (Good-
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man et al., 1992). Thus, it is possible that some of the anxiety that children feel about 
testifying and their negative feelings about the process may be a reflection of what 
they are hearing from their parents or sensing about their parents’ emotions. Al-
though much consideration has focused on what to do for children directly, both 
during the investigative and testimony phase, it appears that a significant mitigator 
of distress throughout the legal process is the presence of a supportive adult, most 
usually the mother in child sexual abuse cases. Therefore, another important ave-
nue for supporting children in legal settings should focus on the role of the parent 
or adult support person and on identifying the kinds of interventions that would 
enhance their effectiveness with the children. If parents are less anxious, if they 
thoroughly understand the legal process, and if they feel the process is fair, their at-
titudes will likely influence their children’s perceptions. This would be particularly 
true for the youngest and therefore most vulnerable children. 
Possible ways of preventing children from experiencing the stress of testifying 
in open court include the use of videotaped testimony or closed circuit television. 
Quas and McAuliff outline the research in this area and note that these accommo-
dations, while possibly reducing the stress on children, remain highly controver-
sial because they require significant modification of trial court proceedings and 
may impinge upon the right of the defendant to cross-examine the child. These 
rarely used modifications to courtroom procedures, while reducing immediate 
stress, may have longer term unintended consequences for children. As noted, 
children most often testify because they have been abused, most frequently in 
the form of sexual abuse. However, with any abuse, children typically feel guilty 
about what has happened to them. The abuse is usually kept secret which, ag-
gravates its psychological effect on the child. The use of videotaped testimony 
which keeps the child out of court may eliminate the stress of the child having 
to appear in court, but may perpetuate the sense that what has happened to the 
child should be kept secret because it is shameful. The same concerns are rele-
vant to the use of closed-circuit television to allow children to testify outside the 
open courtroom. It may reinforce the notion that children need to hide from both 
the perpetrator and the embarrassment of what has happened to them. Being able 
to testify in open court about what has happened to them may have the poten-
tial to be therapeutic for some children. In the studies from other countries that 
compared closed-circuit testimony with open court testimony, were the children 
who testified in open court properly prepared to do so? The degree and quality 
of preparation might substantially influence the relative stressfulness of testifying 
via closed-circuit television and of testifying in open court. 
In their conclusion, Quas and McAuliff reference therapeutic jurisprudence 
and recognize that law is a social force that can bring about therapeutic or 
antitherapeutic outcomes for those involved. They note that we cannot eliminate 
all stress for children who participate in legal procedures. We should question, 
however, whether we should want to eliminate all stress. It is important in reflect-
ing upon this question and this literature that we distinguish between stress and 
trauma. Often when we look at information on the impact of court procedures 
on children, stress and trauma seem to be used interchangeably. The mere fact 
that something creates anxiety or stress does not mean that it will cause trauma. 
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Trauma “is an emotional wound or shock that creates substantial, lasting dam-
age to the psychological development of a person, …” (American Heritage, 2000). 
When individuals face stressful situations and are able master them, such experi-
ences have the potential to increase coping skills and a sense of self-efficacy (Ban-
dura, 1986). Therefore, we should ask whether the stress of legal procedures, spe-
cifically testifying, is necessarily bad for children if they have the proper tools 
with which to manage that stress? We should certainly modify those aspects of 
legal proceedings that cause unnecessary stress, such as unnecessary repeat in-
terviews, lack of knowledge, and other sources of such unnecessary stress. How-
ever, children might be best served by teaching them how to cope with the dis-
tress and difficulties involved in dealing with the court process. Children also 
might be well served by educating their caretakers about how to cope with their 
child’s stress and with their own. Therefore, assisting the children and their care-
takers in managing the stress of testifying may substantially influence the long-
term effects of participation in the legal process. 
References 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition. (2000). Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Baldus, D. C., Woodworth, G., Grosso, C. M., & Christ, A. M. (2002). Arbitrariness and 
discrimination in the administration of the death penalty: A legal and empirical analy-
sis of the Nebraska experience (1973–1999). Nebraska Law Review, 81, 486–756. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Cardona, L. (1994). Behavioral approaches to pain and anxiety in the pediatric patient. 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 3(3), 449–464. 
Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1995). Jeopardy in the courtroom: A scientific analysis of children’s testi-
mony. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-IV). (1994). Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Association. 
Elliott, D. M., & Briere, J. (1994). Forensic sexual abuse evaluations of older children: Dis-
closures and symptomatology. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 12, 261–277. 
Faller, K. C. (2007). Interviewing children about sexual abuse: Controversies and best practice. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goodman, G. S., Taub, E. P., Jones, D. P. H., England, P., Port, L. K., Rudy, L., & Prado, L. 
(1992). Testifying in criminal court. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Devel-
opment, 57 (5, Serial No. 229). 
London, K., Bruck, M., Ceci, S. J., & Shuman, D. W. (2005). Disclosure of child sexual abuse: 
what does the research tell us about the ways that children tell? Psychology, Public Pol-
icy, and Law, 11, 194–226. 
Lyon, T. D. (2007). False denials: Overcoming methodological biases in abuse disclosure 
research. In M. E. Pipe, M. E. Lamb, Y. Orbach, & A. C. Cederborg (Eds.), Child sexual 
abuse: Disclosure, delay and denial (pp. 41–62). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
pr o t e C t i n g We l l-Be i n g Wh i l e pu r S u i n g Ju S t i C e     115
Melton, G. B., Limber, S., Jacobs, J. E., Oberlander, L. B., Berliner, L., & Yamamoto, M. 
(1992). Preparing sexually abused children for testimony: Children’s perceptions of the legal 
process (Final report to the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Grant No 90-
CA-1274). Lincoln: University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Center on Children, Families, and 
the Law. 
Olafson, E. (2007). Children’s memory and suggestibility. In K. C. Faller, Interviewing chil-
dren about sexual abuse: Controversies and best practice (pp. 10–34). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Olafson, E., & Lederman, C. (2006). The state of the debate about children’s disclosure pat-
terns in child sexual abuse cases. Juvenile and Family Court Journal, 57(1), 27–39. 
Pinto, R. P., & Hollandsworth, J. G. (1989). Using videotape modeling to prepare children 
psychologically for surgery: Influence of parents and costs versus benefits of providing 
preparation services. Health Psychology, 8(1), 79–95. 
Poole, D. A., & Lamb, M. E. (1998). Investigative interviews of children: A guide for helping pro-
fessionals. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Quas, J. A., & McAuliff, B. D. (2009). Accommodating child witnesses in the criminal jsu-
tice system: implications for death penalty cases. Chapter 3 in Robert F. Schopp, Rich-
ard L. Wiener, Brian H. Bornstein, and Steven L. Willborn. (eds.), Mental Disorder and 
Criminal Law: Responsibility, Punishment and Competence. New York: Springer (this 
volume). 
Quas, J. A., Goodman, G. S, Ghetti, S., Alexander, K. W., Edelstein, R., Redlich, A. D., Cor-
don, I., & Jones, D. P. H. (2005). Childhood sexual assault victims: Long-term outcomes 
after testifying in criminal court. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Develop-
ment, 70 (2, Serial No. 280). 
Roesler, T. A., & Wind, T. W. (1994). Telling the secret: Adult women describe their disclo-
sures of incest. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 9(3), 327–338. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
Sgroi, S. (1982). The handbook of clinical intervention in child sexual abuse. Lexington, Massa-
chusetts: D.C. Heath and Company. 
Shaw, J. A., Lewis, J. E., Loeb, A., Rosado, J., & Rodriguez, R. A. (2001). A comparison of 
Hispanic and African-American sexually abused girls and their families. Child Abuse & 
Neglect, 25, 1363–1379. 
Tedesco, J. F., & Schnell, S. V. (1987). Children’s reaction to sexual abuse investigation and 
litigation. Child Abuse & Neglect, 11, 267–272. 
Wexler, D. B., & Schopp, R. F. (1992). Therapeutic jurisprudence: A new approach to Men-
tal Health Law. In D. K. Kagehiro & W. S. Laufer (Eds.), Handbook of psychology and law 
(pp. 361–379). New York: Springer–Verlag Press. 
Winick, B. (2009). Determining when severe mental illness should disqualify a defen-
dant from capitol punishment. Chapter 2 in Robert F. Schopp, Richard L. Wiener, Bri-
an H. Bornstein, and Steven L. Willborn. (eds.), Mental Disorder and Criminal Law: Re-
sponsibility, Punishment and Competence. New York: Springer (this volume).
